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Abstract
We consider empirical measurement of equivalent/compensating variation resulting from
price-change of a discrete good using individual-level data, when there is unobserved hetero-
geneity in preferences. We show that for binary and unordered multinomial choice, the mar-
ginal distributions of EV/CV can be expressed as simple closed-form functionals of conditional
choice-probabilities under essentially unrestricted preference-distributions. These results hold
even when the distribution/dimension of unobserved heterogeneity are neither known nor identi-
ed and utilities are neither quasi-linear nor parametrically specied. The welfare distributions
take simple forms which are easy to compute in applications. In particular, average EV for a
price-rise equals the change in average Marshallian consumer-surplus and is smaller than average
CV for a normal good. These nonparametric point-identication results fail for ordered choice
if the unit-price is identical for all alternatives, thereby providing a connection to Hausman-
Neweys (2014) partial identication results for the limiting case of continuous choice.
Keywords: Binary Choice, Multinomial Choice, Ordered Choice, Applied Welfare Analysis,
Compensating Varation, Equivalent Variation, Unobserved Heterogeneity, Unrestricted Hetero-
geneity, Nonparametric Identication.
1 Introduction
This paper concerns the empirical measurement of money-metric welfare in regard to goods which
are consumed or, more generally, decisions which are made, in discrete form. The specic focus is
I am grateful to Richard Blundell, Martin Browning, Ian Crawford, Eric Gautier, Arthur Lewbel and Whitney
Newey for helpful feedback and encouragement. I would also like to thank the co-editor Joel Sobel and four anonymous
referees for their suggestions which led to substantial improvement in both the content and the exposition. All
remaining errors are mine.
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on evaluating welfare-e¤ects of price changes, such as those brought about by taxes and subsidies.
Examples include, inter alia, the e¤ects of taxing unemployment-benets on exiting unemployment,
of fare-hikes on choice of mode of transportation and of price discounts on consumersbrand-choice
in supermarkets. The setting is where the researcher observes realizations of the discrete decision at
the individual-level from micro-datasets which also record the individuals characteristics, including
income, and prices faced by her in regard to the discrete decision. The goal is to estimate the
impact on individual welfare, measured in terms of income compensation, of a hypothetical change
in price. The analysis incorporates unobserved, individual heterogeneity in utility functions and
focuses on recovering the distribution of the impact of price change on individual welfare arising
from such heterogeneity without restricting the nature of heterogeneity or specifying functional
form of utilities.
Overview of results: Our key results for binary and unordered multinomial choice are: (i) the
marginal distribution and, consequently, the average of compensating variation (CV) and equivalent
variation (EV) corresponding to a price change are nonparametrically point-identied solely from
choice probabilities, (ii) for a price rise, the average EV is identical to the change in average
Marshallian consumer surplus even if utility is not quasi-linear in income, (iii) the average CV
exceeds the average EV if the good is normal and (iv) the above conclusions hold even if the
dimension/distribution of heterogeneity are not identied. These results are fully nonparametric in
the sense that they do not require one to specify the dimension or distribution of heterogeneity and
the functional form of utilities thus allowing for extremely general preference distributions in the
population. A practical advantage of our results is that they express welfare distributions as simple,
closed-form functionals of choice probabilities and thus can be easily computed in applications.
Finally, we show that (v) nonparametric point-identication of EV/CV distributions fails in the case
of ordered choice with three or more alternatives if the unit price is identical across all alternatives.
To our knowledge, these constitute the rst set of results in the econometric literature on the
nonparametric identication of money-metric welfare distributions for discrete choice.
Related literature: A large literature exists in econometrics on demand estimation from indi-
vidual consumption data incorporating unobserved heterogeneity (c.f., Lewbel, 2001 and references
therein). Indeed, an important use of such demand estimates is the calculation of welfare e¤ects of
price change arising from taxes and subsidies. For demand of a good that is consumed in continu-
ous quantities, such as gasoline, Hausman, 1981, in a seminal paper, formulated the nonparametric
identication and parametric estimation of exact welfare e¤ects of a price change. Vartia, 1983
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provided an alternative computational approach to the same problem. Hausman and Newey, 1995,
extended these analyses by formulating semiparametric estimation of welfare e¤ects and developing
the corresponding theory of statistical inference. Their methods cannot be directly used in discrete
choice settings where the e¤ect of a price change on individual utilities depends in a fundamental
way on the discreteness of choice possibilities as well as on general individual heterogeneity. Specif-
ically, in discrete choice scenarios, corner solutions are generic and this makes it di¢ cult to recover
the compensation functions using the di¤erential-equation based approach of the above papers.
In the discrete choice setting, Domencich and McFadden, 1975 (DM75, henceforth) made the
strong assumption that utility is quasi-linear, i.e., additively separable in income, implying that
choice probabilities are una¤ected by income changes. Under this simplifying but restrictive as-
sumption, Marshallian and Hicksian welfare measures are identical and average welfare e¤ects of
price change can be expressed as the integral of the ordinary Marshallian choice-probabilities (c.f.
DM75, pages 94-99). In a highly inuential subsequent paper, Small and Rosen, 1981 (SR81,
henceforth) investigated the measurement of welfare e¤ects of price and quality change for discrete
choice. In their empirical formulation, SR81 introduced additive scalar heterogeneity in utility
functions but assumed that the discrete good is su¢ ciently unimportant to the consumer so that
income e¤ects from price or quality changes are negligible (c.f., SR81, page 124, assumptions a
and b)  thereby equating Marshallian and Hicksian welfare measures. More recently, Herriges
and Kling, 1999 (HK99) and Dagsvik and Karlstrom, 2005 (DK05), in their analysis of the same
problem, allowed utility to be nonlinear in income and incorporated unobservables in utility but
assumed that these unobservables have both a known dimension and follow a known parametric
distribution for identifying and estimating the distribution of welfare e¤ects of price changes. The
HK99 and DK05 analysis also require the functional forms of utilities to be known up to nite di-
mensional parameters which are either non-stochastic, or stochastic with fully known distributions
and with the heterogeneity entering the utility function in a known way. Apart from the usual
concerns about mis-specication, these parametric approaches do not clarify whether the identi-
cation arises from the functional form assumptions or is more fundamental in the sense that the
choice probabilities contain all the identication-relevant information, with parametric computa-
tions being simply a convenient approximation. Indeed, we will show below that our nonparametric
point-identication results which hold for unordered multinomial choice fail for ordered choice 
a fundamental di¤erence which would not be apparent if one were to focus only on parametric
models.
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In contrast to the works cited above, the purpose of the present paper is to establish non-
parametric point-identication of the distribution of welfare e¤ects of price change in a discrete
choice setting, incorporating unobservable heterogeneity in the utility function, and assuming no
knowledge of the dimension and thus of the distribution of these unobservables. Indeed, in many
applications, it is important to allow for multiple sources of unobserved heterogeneity and it is
easy to see that restricting the dimension of heterogeneity can place arbitrary restrictions on the
variation of individual preferences in the population. For instance, consider the canonical nonpara-
metric binary choice equation Q = 1 f (P; Y ) + " > 0g, where  (P; Y ) is an unknown function
of price P and income Y , and " is a scalar additive heterogeneity with an unknown distribution
(c.f., Matzkin (1992) and Manski (1975)). This model implies that if at a specic price and income
(P; Y ) = (p; y) an individual i prefers to buy while individual j does not (implying "i > "j), then
at no price-income combination (p0; y0), can we have a situation where individual i prefers not to
buy while individual j prefers to buy  an extremely strong (and untestable) restriction. This
restriction is also implied by the more general model q = 1 f (P; Y; ") > 0g, where " is a scalar and
 (p; y; ) is strictly increasing for all p; y. Thus allowing for heterogeneity of unrestricted dimension
immediately extends the scope of the results to a much larger set of preference proles.
The continuous choice analog of the present paper is Hausman and Newey, 2014 (HN14). They
consider unobserved individual heterogeneity of unspecied dimension in utility functions and focus
on recovering average equivalent variation resulting from price change of a continuous consumption
good, based on demand data. HN14 show that (a) the dimension of heterogeneity is not identied
from observed demand and (b) if one allows for heterogeneity of unspecied dimension, then one
cannot point-identify average welfare but may obtain bounds on it. Kitamura and Stoye, 2013 (see
also McFadden and Richter, 1991) have also worked under heterogeneity of unspecied dimension
and provided tests of consumer rationality in that framework. We are not aware of any other work
which performs demand analysis at this level of generality regarding both individual heterogeneity
and the form of utility functions. Hoderlein and Vanhems 2011, Blundell et al 2012, 2013 and
Lewbel and Pendakur, 2013 among others discuss demand and welfare estimation for continuous
choice under restricted heterogeneity.
For binary choice, Ichimura and Thompson, 1998 and Gautier and Kitamura, 2013 considered
random coe¢ cient models where the dimension of heterogeneity is specied to be equal to the
number of regressors (plus one for the random intercept) and enter the individual outcome equation
in a special way, viz., as scalar multipliers one attached to each regressor. These authors provide
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conditions  including large support requirements for regressors  under which the distribution
of these random coe¢ cients can be nonparametrically identied up to scale normalization. Such
support requirements may be restrictive in specic demand applications. Besides, estimation of the
heterogeneity distribution is complicated owing to ill-posed inverse problems. The present paper
shows that for the purpose of welfare analysis, this exercise is not necessary and that even the
dimension of heterogeneity does not need to be specied in advance. This nding appears to be of
signicant practical importance because in demand applications, a key motivation for recovering
the distribution of consumer heterogeneity is the calculation of welfare distributions resulting from
price change.
The welfare analysis presented here is based on the so-called "revealed preference" approach,
where actual choice data are used to infer money-metric welfare impacts of hypothetical price
changes. In an alternative methodology, known as the "stated preference" or contingent-valuation
approach, a sample of individuals are asked how much money they would be willing to accept as
compensation for a hypothetical policy change e.g., a price rise. Lewbel, Linton and McFadden
(2011) have recently shown how distributions of the willingness to pay can be inferred from stated
preference data without imposing parametric assumptions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.1 we analyze the leading case of binary
choice; in section 2.2 we consider the case of unordered multinomial choice. In section 3 we discuss
ordered choice. All proofs are collected in an appendix which also contains an example where CV
and EV distributions are point-identied even when the dimension and distribution of unobserved
heterogeneity are not.
2 Formal Set-up and Results
We rst analyze the binary choice case and obtain the corresponding welfare results. We then
show that the unordered multinomial case can be analyzed by reducing it to a binary case with a
composite outside option and then applying the binary choice results.
2.1 Binary Choice
Consider an individual with income Y , who faces the choice between buying and not buying a binary
good which costs P . Let W represent the quantity of numeraire which the individual consumes in
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addition to the binary good. Suppose that the utility realized by the individual is given by8<: U1 (W;) , if choose 1,U0 (W;) , if choose 0, (1)
Here  is a possibly vector-valued, individual-specic taste-variable of unknown dimension, unob-
served by the econometrician, which enter the utility functions in any arbitrary way. Income and
prices faced by the individual are observed by the econometrician. In addition, he may observe a
set of covariates. The latter will be suppressed in the exposition below for notational clarity, i.e.,
the entire analysis should be thought of as implicitly conditioned on these observed covariates.
Given total income Y , the budget constraint is W + PQ = Y where Q 2 f0; 1g represents the
binary choice. Replacing the budget constraint in (1), the consumers realized utility is given by8<: U1 (Y   P; ) , if choose 1,U0 (Y; ) , if choose 0. (2)
A consumer of type , income Y and facing price P chooses option 1 (buy the good) i¤
U1 (Y   P; ) > U0 (Y; ).
Dene the structural choice probability at hypothetical price and income (p; y) as
q (p; y)  Pr fU1 (y   p; ) > U0 (y; )g 
Z
1 fU1 (y   p; ) > U0 (y; )g dF () , (3)
where F () denotes the marginal distribution of . This is akin to the "average structural function"
dened in Blundell and Powell, 2003. Our identication results in this paper are concerned with
expressing the marginal distributions of welfare in terms of q (; ).
When observed realizations of P and Y are jointly independent of preference heterogeneity
 (conditional on observed covariates), one can obtain q (; ) by a nonparametric regression of
the individuals decision to buy alternative 1 on prices and income  i.e., the Marshallian choice
probability. Independence of preference heterogeneity and budget sets has been assumed in all
pre-existing research on welfare estimation for discrete choice, including DM75, SR81 and DK05.
It is a maintained assumption in random coe¢ cient models, c.f., Ichimura and Thompson, 1998 and
Gautier and Kitamura, 2012, which are more restrictive in regard to the form and dimension of het-
erogeneity than our set-up. Conditional independence is also assumed in Hausman and Newey, 2014
in the context of continuous choice with unrestricted heterogeneity. If conditional independence
fails, then q (; ) can be recovered using, say, control functions (Blundell and Powell, 2003), which
satisfy that  is independent of prices and income, conditional on the control functions. Petrin
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and Train (2010) demonstrate, both theoretically and empirically, how to use control functions
to recover average structural functions in parametric multinomial choice models. Note, however,
that our key results in this paper establish the relationship between welfare distributions and the
structural choice probabilities q (; ). These results hold no matter whether price/income are en-
dogenous or exogenous. The impact of endogeneity is that it a¤ects how one could consistently
estimate q (; ).1
Now, we impose the following assumption on the utility functions our only substantive as-
sumption in this paper:
Assumption 1 Suppose that for each , U0 (a; ) and U1 (a; ) are continuous and strictly increas-
ing in a. Let U 11 (b; ) denote the unique solution x to the equation U1 (x; ) = b and U
 1
0 (b; )
denote the unique solution in x to the equation U0 (x; ) = b.
Strict monotonicity simply says that, all else equal, more numeraire is better. The continuity
condition is technical and guarantees that inverses of the utility functions are dened everywhere.
The above specication is far more general than the additive, scalar heterogeneity structure
used in DM75 and SR81 where utility is given by8<: U1 (Y   P ) + "1, if choose 1,U0 (Y ) + "0, if choose 0,
where the functional forms of U1 (; ) and U0 (; ) are known (up to estimable nite dimensional
parameters), "1 and "0 are scalar random variables, independent of price and income and have a
known distribution. DK05 (c.f. section 5 of their paper) consider the mixed multinomial logit-type
structure 8<: U1 (Y   P; ) + "1, if choose 1,U0 (Y; ) + "0, if choose 0, (4)
where utilities are of known functional form and smooth in parameters; the random coe¢ cients ,
which enter the utilities in a known way, are independent of scalar-valued additive errors "1; "0,
1Accordingly, throughout this paper, we use the term "point-identied" to mean that welfare distributions can be
expressed as exact closed-form functionals of the structural choice probabilities q (; ) and "failure of point identi-
cation" to mean that they cannot. If q (; ) itself is also point-identied from choice data, either via nonparametric
regression in the exogenous case and control functions in the endogenous case, then we get a "full" identication
result in that welfare distributions can be expressed directly as functions of observed data.
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and (; "1; "0) have a fully known joint probability distribution independent of (P; Y ). DK05 derive
expressions for the distribution of Hicksian welfare measures in terms of these known heterogeneity
distributions and known utility functions.2 Indeed, if (i) the dimension and distribution of un-
observed heterogeneity are separately identied from choice probabilities, (ii) functional forms of
utilities are known and (iii) the key unobservables (denoted by "s) enter as additive scalar errors in
utility functions and all other unobservables (denoted by ) are either non-existent or enter utilities
in a known way and are independent of the "s, then one can use the expressions in DK05 to calcu-
late the distribution of Hicksian welfare measures. These conditions are restrictive and somewhat
arbitrary. In the appendix of the present paper, we provide an example of binary choice where
the dimension and thus distribution of heterogeneity are not identied and thus the DK05 results
cannot be applied, and yet welfare distributions are nonparametrically point-identied using our
results because they are based solely on the choice probability functions.3
The limitations of a fully parametric approach are brought out more clearly in the context of
ordered choice, discussed below in section 3. In this case, making parametric assumptions would
enable one to "calculate" the distribution functions of CV/EV exactly (c.f., remark 3 below). How-
ever, we show in section 3 that for ordered choice, the distributions of CV/EV generically fail to be
nonparametrically point-identied; thus the parametric calculations in this case would correspond
to identication obtained solely via functional form assumptions. This important di¤erence be-
tween the ordered and unordered case would not be apparent if one were only using parametrically
specied utility functions and heterogeneity distributions.
In contrast, our identication results require only that utilities are continuous and strictly in-
creasing in the numeraire (assumption 1) and do not require one to specify the functional form
of the utilities, including how unobserved heterogeneity enter utilities, to impose di¤erentiabil-
ity, to specify the dimension and distribution of unobserved heterogeneity or to assume arbitrary
2For example, DK05 page 63, after the proof of theorem 2, clarify that ...one can calculate the Hicksian choice
probabilities readily, provided the cumulative distribution FB () is known ...."
3A referee has pointed out that even in the scalar heterogeneity case, e.g., in a probit model, the variance and
hence the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity is not identied from choice probabilities.
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independence conditions among di¤erent components of heterogeneity, as in model (4) above.4
Welfare Analysis: Recall our set-up in (2) and consider a hypothetical ceteris paribus price
increase from p0 to p1. We wish to calculate the marginal distributions of welfare change evaluated
at xed income y corresponding to this price change. In particular, the EV is the amount of income
S to be subtracted from an  type individual with income y and facing prices p0 in order that her
(maximized) utility in this situation equals that when she were facing prices p1 where p1 > p0.
Thus SEV (y; p0; p1; ) is the solution S to the equation
max fU0 (y   S; ) ; U1 (y   S   p0; )g = max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p1; )g . (5)
Similarly, the compensating variation measures the income S to be given to an individual of type
 at income y and facing price p1 > p0, so that their maximized utility in this situation is equal to
their maximized utility when prices were p0 and income was y, i.e., SCV (y; p0; p1; ) is the solution
S to the equation
max fU0 (y + S; ) ; U1 (y + S   p1; )g = max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p0; )g . (6)
In what follows, we will establish the marginal distribution of SEV (y; p0; p1; ) and SCV (y; p0; p1; )
induced by the distribution of . This will be done via two intermediate lemmas which give the
analytical form of individual welfare changes in terms of the underlying utility functions and un-
observed heterogeneity. Using these lemmas, we will establish the key theorem giving the ultimate
form of welfare distributions in terms of choice probabilities.
Lemma 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then (i) if U1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y; ), then SEV (y; p0; p1; ) =
4Our set-up is also more general than a pure random coe¢ cient model, which postulates that Q =
1 f P + "1Y + "0 > 0g, where ("0; "1) is a 2-dimensional random vector independent of (P; Y ). For example, the
random coe¢ cient model implies that for P = p xed, if an individual prefers to buy at income y and also at income
y0 > y, then she must also prefer to buy at any intermediate income y + (1  ) y0 for  2 (0; 1). This is because
 p+ "1
 
y + (1  ) y0+ "0 =  f p+ "1y + "0g+ (1  ) p+ "1y0 + "0	 ,
so that if each term on the RHS is positive, then so is the LHS. This is not imposed by our set-up because
U1 (y   p; ) > U0 (y; ) and U1
 
y0   p;  > U0  y0; 
need not imply that
U1
 
y + (1  ) y0   p;  > U0  y + (1  ) y0;  .
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0; (ii) if U1 (y   p1; )  U0 (y; ) < U1 (y   p0; ), then SEV (y; p0; p1; ) = y p0 U 11 (U0 (y; ) ; );
(iii) if U1 (y   p1; ) > U0 (y; ), then SEV (y; p0; p1; ) = p1   p0. (See appendix for a proof.)
These three cases correspond respectively to s who (i) do not buy at the lower price, (ii) those
who switch from buying at lower price to not buying at the higher price and (iii) those who buy at
both low and high price. While the zero EV is obvious for the rst group, the other cases are not
entirely obvious because one needs to understand how buying is a¤ected when income is deducted
from a situation of low price.
Lemma 2 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then, (i) if U1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y; ), then SCV (y; p0; p1; ) =
0; (ii) if U0 (y; ) < U1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y + p1   p0; ), then SCV (y; p0; p1; ) = U 10 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; ) 
y; (iii) if U1 (y   p0; ) > U0 (y + p1   p0; ), then SCV (y; p0; p1; ) = p1   p0 (see appendix for
proof).
These three cases correspond respectively to s who (i) do not buy at the lower price, (ii) those
who switch from buying at lower price to not buying at the higher price but when compensated by
the amount of price change would prefer not to buy and (iii) switchers who when compensated by
the amount of price change would prefer to buy as well as those who buy at both low and high
price. While the zero CV is obvious for the rst group, the other cases are not obvious because one
needs to understand how buying is a¤ected when income is raised from a situation of high price.
We now state our main result which expresses the marginal distribution of individual CV and
EV in terms of choice probabilities.
Theorem 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Consider a price rise from p0 to p1. Then the EV and
CV evaluated at hypothetical income y have marginal distributions given by
Pr

SEV (y; p0; p1; )  a
	
=
8>>><>>>:
0, if a < 0,
1  q (p0 + a; y) , if 0  a < p1   p0,
1, if a  p1   p0,
(7)
Pr

SCV (y; p0; p1; )  a
	
=
8>>><>>>:
0, if a < 0,
1  q (p0 + a; y + a) , if 0  a < p1   p0,
1, if a  p1   p0,
(8)
where q (:) is dened above in (3) (see appendix for proof).
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Some Intuition: An intuitive interpretation of the result is as follows. First consider EV.
Consider an  type individual whose reservation price for the binary good at income y is p0+t (y; )
where 0 < t (y; ) < p1   p0. This means that she is indi¤erent between buying and not buying at
price p0 + t (y; ) when she has income y so that
U0 (y; ) = U1 (y   (p0 + t (y; )) ; ) . (9)
At any higher price, the RHS is smaller and she does not buy; at any lower price, the RHS is larger
and she buys. But since y   (p0 + t (y; )) = (y   t (y; ))  p0, we get that
U0 (y; ) = U1 ((y   t (y; ))  p0; ) ,
which means that if we take away an amount of the numeraire equal to t (y; ), then she would reach
the same level of utility from buying at price p0 as she would when not buying. Recall that since
t (y; ) < p1   p0, she was not buying at the higher price p1 and getting utility U0 (y; ), which is
precisely the reference utility for calculation of her EV. The previous display therefore implies that
the EV for a price increase from p0 to p1 is t (y; ) for this consumer. That is, the EV equals the
di¤erence between the reservation price and the initial lower price p0. Therefore, the probability
that EV is less than a equals the proportion of individuals with reservation price less than p0 + a
which, by denition, equals the fraction of individuals who do not buy at prices higher than p0+a,
and is thus given by 1  q (p0 + a; y).
The intuitive interpretation of the CV distributional result, viz., eqn. (8) is slightly more
involved and is as follows. Consider an  type individual, who faces initial price p0 and has income
y. Now consider a situation where price goes up to p0 + a where 0  a < p1   p0 and her income
is compensated by the amount of price-rise a. Suppose that in this new situation, her utility from
not buying alternative 1 exceeds her utility from buying it, i.e.,
U0 (y + a; ) > U1 ((y + a)  (p0 + a) ; ) = U1 (y   p0; ) .
Since U0 (; ) is strictly increasing, it is also true that U0 (y + a; ) > U0 (y; ). Putting the two
together,
U0 (y + a; ) > max fU1 (y   p0; ) ; U0 (y; )g .
For CV calculation, the RHS utility is the reference utility (see (6)) and therefore any compensation
exceeding a will lead such a person to not buy alternative 1 and enjoy a utility level exceeding the
reference utility level. Thus for such a person, the CV must not exceed a. Such individuals can be
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identied in the data as those who do not buy alternative 1 when they have income y+a and price
is p0 + a and thus Pr
 
SCV  a = 1   q (p0 + a; y + a). In particular, the CV must not exceed a
for those who had switched initially from buying alternative 1 to not buying it due to the price-rise
from p0 to p0 + a but who would nonetheless, upon getting compensated income y + a, strictly
prefer to not buy alternative 1 when price is p0 + a. These individuals can be made as happy as
they originally were by paying a compensation strictly less than a and letting them leave without
buying alternative 1.
Remark 1 It is important to note that the proofs of lemma 1, 2 and theorem 1 do not rely on
whether the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity  is known or identied. In part F of the
appendix, we provide an example where even the dimension of heterogeneity is not identied and yet
assumption 1 is satised, so that the marginal distributions of welfare changes are point-identied.
Non-decreasing C.D.F: In order for the C.D.F. of CV in eqn. (8) to be weakly increasing,
one needs to check whether for all a  0, the function q (p0 + a; y + a) is non-increasing in a for
all y. Similarly, for C.D.F. of EV in eqn. (7) to be weakly increasing, one needs to check that for
all a  0, the function q (p0 + a; y) is non-increasing for all y. Note that according to the random
utility model considered here,
q (p0 + a; y + a)

Z
1 fU1 (y + a  (p0 + a) ; )  U0 (y + a; )g dF ()
=
Z
1 fU1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y + a; )g dF () ,
which is non-increasing in a since U0 (; ) is strictly increasing by assumption 1. Similarly,
q (p0 + a; y) =
Z
1 fU1 (y   p0   a; )  U0 (y; )g dF () ,
which is non-increasing in a since U1 (; ) is assumed to be strictly increasing. One may test these
conditions after estimating an unrestricted q (; y) or impose these restrictions during estimation.
The distributions obtained in theorem 1 imply the following expressions for average welfare
change.
Corollary 1 Suppose Assumption 1 holds. Then for a price increase from p0 to p1, the average
12
EV and CV evaluated at income y are given by
EV (y; p0; p1) =
Z p1
p0
q (p; y) dp, (10)
CV (y; p0; p1) =
Z p1
p0
q (p; y + p  p0) dp. (11)
where q (p; y) is dened in (3). (see appendix for proof).
Since q (p; y) is simply the average Marshallian choice probability of alternative 1, eqn. (10)
shows that the change in Marshallian consumer surplus and the average Hicksian equivalent vari-
ations are equal. This result obtains although the utility functions were not specied to be quasi-
linear. Indeed, for quasi-linear utility, both CV and EV are equal to the change in Marshallian
consumer surplus which is not (necessarily) the case here, as can be seen by comparing eqns (10)
and (11).
The following implications of theorem 1 follow immediately: (i) if alternative 1 is a normal
good, then for xed y and for all p > p0, we have that q (p; y)  q (p; y + p  p0), and hence (10)
and (11) imply that for a price increase from p0 to p1, E(SEV )  E
 
SCV

; (ii) for a per unit tax
of  , the average deadweight loss is given by
DWLtax
 
SEV

=
Z p0(1+)
p0
q (p; y) dp  p0  q (p0 (1 + ) ; y) ;
DWLtax
 
SCV

=
Z p0(1+)
p0
q (p; y + p  p0) dp  p0  q (p0 (1 + ) ; y) ;
and (iii) when a subsidy reduces prices from p1 to p0, the labelling of EV and CV reverses and one
gets that
CV (p0; p1; y) =
Z p1
p0
q (p; y) dp,
EV (p0; p1; y) =
Z p1
p0
q (p; y + p  p0) dp. (12)
2.2 Multinomial Choice
In this subsection, we show that welfare analysis for unordered multinomial choice can be conducted,
under an appropriate assumption (c.f., assumption 2 below), by reducing the problem to a binary
choice problem with a composite outside option and then applying theorem 1. Toward that end,
assume that a consumer with income Y and taste  faces a mutually exclusive set of alternatives
with alternative-specic prices  the classic example being choice of the mode of transportation
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(e.g., bus, train, walk etc.). The consumer can pick only one among the various alternatives. Let
the set of alternatives be denoted by f0; 1; :::; Jg with Pj denoting the price of the jth alternative
for j = 1; :::; J and the 0th alternative denoting not choosing any of the J alternatives. As before,
assume that utility from choosing alternative 0 is U0 (y; ) and choosing alternative j produces
utility Uj (Y   Pj ; ). We are interested in calculating the marginal distribution of EV and CV,
resulting from a price increase for alternative 1 from P1 = p10 to P1 = p11, with the prices of the
other alternatives held xed at (p2; p3; :::; pJ) and income xed at Y = y.
Now, dene
p 1
def
= (p2; p3; :::; pJ) ;
U (p 1; y; )
def
= max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   p2; ) ; :::; UJ (y   pJ ; )g . (13)
A consumer of type , income y and facing prices (p1; p 1) chooses alternative 1 i¤U1 (y   p1; ) >
U (p 1; y; ).
Dene q1 (t; p 1; y) to be the structural probability of choosing alternative 1 when its own price
is t, prices of the other alternatives are p 1 and income is y, i.e.,
q1 (t; p 1; y)
def
=
Z
1 fU1 (y   t; )  U (p 1; y; )g dF () . (14)
Dene EV to be the solution S to the equation
max fU0 (y   S; ) ; U1 (y   S   p10; ) ; U2 (y   S   p2; ) ; :::UJ (y   S   pJ ; )g
= max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p11; ) ; U2 (y   p2; ) ; :::; UJ (y   pJ ; )g . (15)
Similarly, dene CV as the solution S to the equation
max fU0 (y + S; ) ; U1 (y + S   p11; ) ; U2 (y + S   p2; ) ; :::UJ (y + S   pJ ; )g
= max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p10; ) ; U2 (y   p2; ) ; :::; UJ (y   pJ ; )g . (16)
Note that using (13) and using the fact that max fa; b; cg = max fa;max fb; cgg, equations (15) and
(16) can be re-written respectively as
max fU (p 1; y   S; ) ; U1 (y   S   p10; )g = max fU (p 1; y; ) ; U1 (y   p11; )g , (17)
max fU (p 1; y + S; ) ; U1 (y + S   p11; )g = max fU (p 1; y; ) ; U1 (y   p10; )g , (18)
which are basically (5) and (6) with U0 (; ) replaced by the utility of the composite alternative
U (p 1; ; ). Therefore, we can perform welfare analysis in this case essentially by applying theorem
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1, as long as U (p 1; ; ) satises the same assumption as U0 (; ) in assumption 1. Toward that
end, make the following assumption.
Assumption 2 Uj (; ) is continuous and strictly increasing for each , for j = 0; 1::::J .
Then we have the following result.
Theorem 2 Suppose assumption 2 holds. Consider a price increase for alternative 1 from p10
to p11, with the prices of all other alternatives held xed at p 1. Then EV and CV evaluated at
hypothetical income y have marginal distributions given by
Pr

SEV (y; p10; p11; p 1; )  r

=
8>>><>>>:
0, if r < 0,
1  q1 (p10 + r; p 1; y) if 0  r < p11   p10,
1, if r  p11   p10,
(19)
Pr

SCV (y; p10; p11; p 1; )  r

=
8>>><>>>:
0, if r < 0,
1  q1 (p10 + r; p 1; y + r) if 0  r < p11   p10,
1, if r  p11   p10,
(20)
with q1 (; ; ) dened in (14). (Proof in appendix)
Analogous to corollary 1, it follows that the expected values of EV and CV evaluated at income
y are now given respectively by
E (EV ) =
Z p11
p10
q1 (r; p 1; y) dr, (21)
E (CV ) =
Z p11
p10
q1 (r; p 1; y + r   p10) dr. (22)
Computational Issues: As in any nonparametric estimation problem, we can estimate q1 (t; p 1; y)
without any parametric assumptions for those price-income combinations which lie within the range
of the observed data. For combinations which may not be exactly observed in the sample, but
nonetheless lie within the observed range of values, one would typically use a local smoothing
method such as Nadaraya-Watson regression. However, if the hypothetical initial and/or nal
price lie outside the range of observed prices, or if P1 does not vary enough across individuals for
given P 1, Y , then either we need to use a parametric model or we can only bound the expected
EV/CV (e.g., using q1 (; p 1; y) is non-increasing). Note, however, that these issues do not a¤ect
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the conclusions of theorem 1 or 2 for example, expected EV is still
R p11
p10
q1 (p; p 1; y) dp it is the
calculation of q1 (p1; p 1; y) for (p1; p 1; y) lying outside observed price-income ranges or P1 having
limited variation that cannot be done entirely nonparametrically.
Even when one is willing to make parametric assumptions, results like (19) and (20) are still very
useful, since one can apply them to compute welfare distributions directly from choice-probabilities
without computing expenditure functions. For example, consider the case of (J + 1) alternatives
f0; 1; 2; :::; Jg, linear utilities Uj (a; ) = ja + "j , with "s distributed as IID extreme valued,
independently of price and income. Then the conditional choice probability for alternative 1 is
given by the multinomial logit form5
q1 (p1; p 1; y) =
exp(1 (y   p1))
exp(1 (y   p1)) +
P
j 6=1 exp(j (y   pj))
, (23)
where p0  0 and the s are estimable via ML. Accordingly, from (22),
E
 
SCV

=
Z p11
p10
 
exp(1 (y   p10))
exp(1 (y   p10)) +
P
j 6=1 exp(j (y + r   p10   pj))
!
dr. (24)
These integrals can be calculated numerically by averaging the estimated integrand, over a grid,
rk = p10 +
k
K+1 (p11   p10) ; k = 0; :::;K, i.e.,
E^
 
SCV

=
1
K + 1
KX
k=0
0@ exp(^1 (y   p10))
exp(^1 (y   p10)) +
P
j 6=1 exp(^j

y + kK+1 (p11   p10)  pj

)
1A ,
where
n
^j
o
, j = 0(1)J , denote MLEs of the js in the model given by eqn. (23). Analogous
computations can be performed for other distributional specications, such as multivariate normal
or McFadden and Trains (2000) mixed logit. In an actual application one would be well-advised to
report numerical results for both parametric specications as well as nonparametric ones, whenever
possible, and to examine sensitivity of the ndings to the extent of smoothing.
Inference: The present paper is mainly concerned with identication; a full-scale treatment of
inference covering both the exogenous and endogenous income case is being pursued in a separate
paper (Bhattacharya and Lee, 2014). We simply note here that once a nonparametric estimate of
q1 (p1; p 1; y) is obtained, say, using kernels or series methods, one can estimate the distribution
functions of EV/CV by direct plug-in into eqns (19) and (20). For inference on expected welfare
5As pointed out by a referee, when income is endogenous, the choice-probabilities conditional on a control function
may no longer be expressible in the convenient logit form with a simple adjustment term. In Bhattacharya and Lee
(2014), we explore estimation and inference under endogeneity in greater detail.
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(21) and (22), obtained by integrating the q1 (p1; p 1; y) functions over p1 holding y xed, one
can use distributional results for partial means (c.f., Newey, 1994, Lee, 2014). For a parametric
specication of choice probabilities, the estimate of expected welfare, as is apparent from (24), is
a smooth function of the MLEs of model parameters. Accordingly, one can employ the bootstrap
to conduct inference on mean welfare, whose justication follows via the delta method.
Remark 2 It is interesting to note that when income is endogenous, there is a distinction between
(i) the marginal distribution of welfare evaluated at hypothetical income y (the parameter of interest
in the present paper) and (ii) the conditional distribution of welfare evaluated at hypothetical income
y for the subpopulation whose value of realized income is y0. For EV, these are given respectively
by
 (a; y)
def
=
Z
1

SEV (p10; p11; p 1; y; )  a
	
dF () ,
c
 
a; y; y0
 def
=
Z
1

SEV (p10; p11; p 1; y; )  a
	
dFjY
 
jy0 ,
where F () denotes the marginal distribution of  and FjY (jy0) denotes the conditional distribution
of  for the sub-population whose current income is y0. In a treatment e¤ect context,  (a; y)
is analogous to the average treatment e¤ect and c (a; y; y0) is analogous to the average e¤ect of
treatment on the treated. In this paper, we focus on the former parameter. Of course, if income is
exogenous conditional on observed covariates (as assumed in DM75, HK99, DK05 and in random
coe¢ cient models), then the two parameters coincide.
Sequential Choice: The above results pertain to a one-time choice and is based on data from
a single cross-section, which is also the set-up in all existing work on empirical welfare analysis, to
our knowledge. However, as noted by a referee, many discrete decisions in reality involve sequential
choices over time. Welfare-analysis for such dynamic discrete choice would depend on the specics
of the setting, e.g., whether future prices and income are known or uncertain, whether price change
is temporary or permanent, whether income compensation is one-time or recurrent, etc. As such,
a comprehensive treatment of all such cases requires a separate paper and is left to future work.
Nonetheless, we note that theorem 1 may be used for welfare-analysis in some simple situations
involving sequential discrete choice, e.g., when an individual chooses one among several alternatives
in the initial period by paying a one-time price, and evaluates the overall utility of choosing each
alternative by the discounted sum of expected future returns resulting from that choice, inclusive
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of discrete decisions to be taken optimally in the future. In this setting, theorem 1 could be used
for welfare analysis corresponding to change in an alternative-specic price in the initial period.
3 Ordered Choice
The multinomial choice scenario of the previous section may be contrasted with a situation of
ordered choice, i.e., where a good can be bought in discrete units of 0, 1, 2, etc. and the per unit
price is the same, no matter how many units are bought, so that a change in the unit price changes
the price of all non-zero alternatives simultaneously. From the identication point-of-view, uniform
unit-price restricts the number of choice-sets on which we can observe the consumersbehavior,
relative to the multinomial case where prices of di¤erent alternatives can vary independently of each
other. Continuous choice, considered in Hausman and Newey, 2014, can be viewed as a limiting
case of ordered choice with uniform unit price. We will demonstrate that for ordered choice, the
distributions of welfare changes are not point-identied in general. However, if the per unit price
is allowed to be di¤erent depending on how many units are bought (e.g., a discount is provided
for larger purchases), then it becomes possible to change, say, the unit price of buying 1 unit while
holding the unit price of other alternatives (e.g., buying 2 units, 3 units etc.) xed. This case will
then reduce to the multinomial case above and one would end up with a point-identication result.
To take a simple example, consider two scenarios. In scenario A, one chooses between 1 banana, 2
bananas and no banana where the price per banana is p. In this case, the distributions of CV/EV
corresponding to changing the price p will not be point-identied. In scenario B, one still chooses
between 1 banana, 2 bananas and no banana but the price is p1 per banana if one buys a single
banana but it is p2 per banana if one buys 2 bananas. In this second scenario, the distribution of
CV/EV arising from changing p1 while holding p2 xed (or vice versa) are point-identied since
one may simply view this as a multinomial choice problem with 3 alternatives where the "price"
of alternative 1 (buy no banana) is zero, that of alternative 2 (buy 1 banana) is p1 and that of
alternative 3 (buy 2 bananas) is 2p2.
Scenario A: To see the failure of point-identication in scenario A explicitly, let U0 (y; ),
U1 (y   p; ) and U2 (y   2p; ) denote the utility from buying 0, 1 or 2 bananas respectively, where
p denotes the (uniform) unit price per banana and the households income is y. Assume that
for each j = f0; 1; 2g, Uj (; ) is strictly increasing with probability 1. From the conditional
choice probabilities of alternatives 0, 1 and 2 on observed budget sets (p; y), we can identify the
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probabilities of the following sets
A0 (p
; y) = f : U0 (y; )  max fU1 (y   p; ) ; U2 (y   2p; )gg ,
A1 (p
; y) = f : U1 (y   p; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p; )gg ,
A2 (p
; y) = f : U2 (y   2p; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p; )gg , (25)
for di¤erent values of (p; y). It is important to note in each line of the previous display the utilities
for the 3 alternatives being compared are evaluated at the same (p; y). The choice probabilities
cannot point-identify, for example, the probability of a set like
f : U1 (y   p; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p; )gg ,
where p 6= p, because no individual in the data faces two di¤erent unit prices for alternative 1
and alternative 2 in scenario A. In other words, no consumer in the population may be observed to
make a choice among the three bundles (0; y), (1; y   p) and (2; y   2p) if p 6= p.
Now, suppose the per unit price p changes from p0 to p1 where p1 > p0. Then the resulting CV
is the solution SCV to the equation
max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p0; ) ; U2 (y   2p0; )g
= max

U0
 
y + SCV ; 

; U1
 
y + SCV   p1; 

; U2
 
y + SCV   2p1; 
	
. (26)
Consider the probability that SCV = p1   p0. If the utility di¤erences are continuously distrib-
uted, then the only situation where SCV = p1   p0 is where the maximum on the LHS of (26) is
U1 (y   p0; ) and that on the RHS is U1
 
y + SCV   p1; 

.6 Thus
Pr

SCV = p1   p0

= Pr
24 U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p0; )g ;
U1 (y + p1   p0   p1; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y + p1   p0   2p1; )g
35
= Pr
24 U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p0; )g ;
U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y   p0   p1; )g
35
= Pr [U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y   2p0; )g] , (27)
6For example, if instead the rst term is the maximum for the LHS of (26) and the second term is the maximum
for the RHS of (26) with S = p1   p0, then
U0 (y; ) = U1
0@y + Sz }| {p1   p0   p1; 
1A = U1 (y   p0; )
which will have zero probability if U1 (y   p0; )   U0 (y; ) is continuously distributed, e.g., for j = 0; 1; 2,
Uj (y   pj ; ) = j ln (y   pj) + j with f0; 1; 2g having extreme value or joint normal distribution.
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by strict monotonicity of U0 (; ) and U2 (; ). For standard parametric models (e.g., Uj (y; ) =
j ln (y)+j with j scalar and normally distributed), the probability in (27) is positive. However,
it is clear from (27) that the probability that SCV = p1   p0 equals the probability of choosing the
bundle (1; y   p0) over the bundles (0; y + p1   p0) and (2; y   2p0). The latter probability can be
nonparametrically point-identied if and only if some consumers in the population face the choice
among these three bundles, which can happen if and only if for some (p; y), we have that
y   p = y   p0
y = y + p1   p0
y   2p = y   2p0.
Replacing the second equation in the rst yields p = y + p1   p0   y + p0 = p1 and replacing this
in the rst equation yields y = y + p1   p0. But y = y + p1   p0 and p = p1 does not satisfy
the third equation. Thus, there is no (p; y) which satises all three equations simultaneously.
In other words, there cannot be any consumer in the population who may be observed to make a
choice among the bundles (0; y + p1   p0), (1; y   p0) and (2; y   2p0), so that we cannot identify
the probability of choosing the bundle (1; y   p0) over the bundles (0; y + p1   p0) and (2; y   2p0)
which is the probability of SCV = p1   p0. Thus the probability that SCV = p1   p0 is positive
but it is nonparametrically unidentied; so the distribution of the CV cannot be nonparametrically
point-identied.
Scenario B: Now, consider scenario B. Indeed, if the per unit price when 2 units are consumed
is xed at p2 and the unit price for consuming 1 unit rises from p0 to p1, then
Pr

SCV = p1   p0

= Pr
24 U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p2; )g ;
U1 (y + p1   p0   p1; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y + p1   p0   2p2; )g
35
= Pr
24 U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   2p2; )g ;
U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y + p1   p0   2p2; )g
35
= Pr [U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y + p1   p0   2p2; )g]
= Pr [U1 ((y + p1   p0)  p1; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y + p1   p0   2p2; )g]
= q1 (p1; p2; y + p1   p0) ,
which is point-identied from the observed choice probability of alternative 1 at price p1, income
y + p1   p0 and unit price of alternative 2 (i.e., of buying 2 units) xed at p2.
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Graphical Illustration: The above discussion is graphically depicted in the following gures.
First, considered ordered choice, depicted in the gure below.
Qty of Numeraire
1 2 Qty of discrete good
Ordered Choice
B: (0, y)
??: (0, y+p1- p0)
A: (1, y- p0)
C: (2, y-2p0)
??: (2, y-p0-p1)
At price p0 and income y, individuals choose between the bundles B = (0; y), A = (1; y   p0) and
C = (2; y   2p0) and at price p1 and compensated income y+p1 p0, they choose between the bun-
dles B0 = (0; y + p1   p0), A = (1; y + p1   p0   p1) = (1; y   p0) and C 0 = (2; y + p1   p0   2p1) =
(2; y   p1   p0). By monotonicity of utility, for every , B0  B and C  C 0. Therefore,
Pr (S = p1   p0) = Pr
fA  B;A  Cg \ A  B0; A  C 0	
= Pr
 
A  C;A  B0 .
But in the ordered choice case, we observe choice behavior only across bundles which lie on the
same straight line (e.g., (B;A;C) or (B0; A; C 0)). Since (B0; A; C) do not lie on a straight line, we
cannot point-identify the probability Pr (A  C;A  B0). Now consider unordered choice.
Qty of Numeraire
1 2 Qty of discrete good
Unordered Choice
B: (0, y)
??: (0, y+p1- p0)
A: (1, y-p0)
D: (2, y-2p2)
??: (2, y+p1-p0-2p2)
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With price of alternative 2 xed at p2, we observe choice behavior across bundles of the form
C (z; p; p2) := f(0; z) ; (1; z   p) ; (2; z   2p2)g
for every combination of (z; p). Now,
Pr
 
SCV = p1   p0

= Pr
fA  B;A  Dg \ A  B0; A  D0	
= Pr
 
A  D0; A  B0 , (28)
since D0  D by monotonicity. Therefore, we can compute the probability (28) as the probability
of choosing (1; z   p) from C (z; p; p2), with z = y + p1   p0 and p = p1.
Remark 3 It is interesting to note that if the functional forms of the utility functions were para-
metrically specied and the dimension and distribution of heterogeneity were assumed to be known
(as in HK99 or DK05), then the probability in (27) would appear to be point-identied. For exam-
ple, if one assumes that for j = 0; 1; 2, Uj (y; ) = j ln (y) + j with f0; 1; 2g distributed as IID
extreme valued, independent of price and income, then (27) reduces to
Pr [U1 (y   p0; )  max fU0 (y + p1   p0; ) ; U2 (y   2p0; )g]
= Pr [1 ln (y   p0) + 1  max f0 ln (y + p1   p0) + 0; 2 ln (y   2p0) + 2g]
=
exp(1 ln (y   p0))
exp(0 ln (y + p1   p0)) + exp(1 ln (y   p0)) + exp(2 ln (y   2p0)) ,
which can be readily "calculated" using ML estimates of the s obtained from choice-data. How-
ever, the identication result underlying this calculation is articial in that it is driven entirely by
functional form assumptions. In other words, nonparametric point-identiability of welfare distrib-
utions in the case of unordered choice and its failure in the ordered case is a fundamental di¤erence
which would not be apparent if one only considered parametric models.
4 Summary and Conclusion
The key insight of this paper is that for price-change in a binary or unordered multinomial choice
situation, the choice probabilities alone contain all the relevant information for nonparametric
recovery of welfare distributions. This result is valid under unrestricted forms of unobserved het-
erogeneity and utility functions, and continues to hold even if the dimension and therefore the
distribution  of unobserved heterogeneity is neither specied, nor identied. Interestingly, the
result fails in the case of ordered choice with three or more alternatives if the unit price is required
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to be the same no matter how many units are bought, thereby providing a link with Hausman and
Neweys (2014) recent nding that for price change of a continuous good, averages of money-metric
welfare is only set-identied under unrestricted heterogeneity.
On the practical end, the distributions of welfare are expressed here as simple closed-form
transformations of choice probabilities, enabling easy computation and inference. Even if one
approximates the choice probabilities by a parametric model, e.g., a mixed logit, these closed-form
expressions can be used to compute welfare-distributions directly from these choice probabilities
without requiring one to compute expenditure functions by reverting to potentially misspecied
utility functions and heterogeneity distributions.
To our knowledge, the present paper delivers the rst set of results in the econometric litera-
ture on nonparametric welfare analysis for discrete choice and does so for essentially unrestricted
preference distributions. Consequently, it signicantly advances the existing literature which (a)
either assumed away the key identication problem by assuming negligible income e¤ects, or (b)
based welfare calculations on parametrically specied and, consequently, potentially misspecied
utility functions and heterogeneity distributions without recognizing that the conditional choice
probabilities themselves contain all the relevant information for money-metric welfare analysis un-
der essentially unrestricted preference distributions.
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Appendix
A. Proof of Lemma 1
We denote the individual EV SEV (y; p0; p1; ) by simply S to avoid cumbersome notation in
the proof. Also for ease of reference, we rewrite equation (5) again:
max fU0 (y   S; ) ; U1 (y   S   p0; )g = max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p1; )g
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Proof. By monotonicity of U1 (; ) and U0 (; ), we must have that S  0 in order for (5) to hold.
Now, in case (i), 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ). So if S > 0, then
max fU0 (y   S; ) ; U1 (y   S   p0; )g < max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p0; )g
= U0 (y; )
 max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p1; )g ,
contradicting (5). This implies that S = 0.
Now, consider case (ii). Given the restriction 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p1; ), the RHS of (5) is
U0 (y; ). Therefore from (5), S must satisfy
U0 (y; ) = max fU1 (y   S   p0; ) ; U0 (y   S; )g . (29)
Now, equation (29) is equivalent to
U0 (y; ) = U1 (y   S   p0; ) . (30)
To see why, suppose the rst term on the RHS of (29) is smaller than the second, i.e.,
U1 (y   S   p0; ) < U0 (y   S; ) : (31)
Then equation (29) implies U0 (y; ) = U0 (y   S; ), implying S = 0 by strict monotonicity of
U0 (; ). But then, the rst term on the RHS of equation (29), viz., U1 (y   S   p0; ) equals
U1 (y   p0; ) while the second term equals U0 (y; ); but because we know that U1 (y   p0; ) 
U0 (y; ) (we are in case (ii) of the proposition), the inequality (31) is violated. Therefore, we must
have that U1 (y   S   p0; )  U0 (y   S; ), so that the maximum on the RHS of equation (29)
must equal U1 (y   S   p0; ), whence the conclusion (30) follows.
From (30), using monotonicity of U1 (; ), we have that S = y   p0   U 11 (U0 (y; ) ; ). Note
that by the continuity condition of assumption 1, the inverse U 11 (; ) is dened everywhere.
Finally, consider case (iii): Given the restriction, 0 > U0 (y; ) U1 (y   p1; ), the RHS of (5)
is U1 (y   p1; ). Now, suppose the LHS of (5) is U0 (y   S; ). But since S  0, we must have that
U0 (y   S; )  U0 (y; ) < U1 (y   p1; ) = U0 (y   S; ) , by (5),
a contradiction. Therefore, the LHS of (5) must be U1 (y   S   p0; ) and therefore by (5),
U1 (y   S   p0; ) = U1 (y   p1; ), whence, by strict monotonicity of U1 (; ), we get that S =
p1   p0.
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B. Proof of Lemma 2
We denote the individual CV SCV (y; p0; p1; ) by simply S to avoid cumbersome notation in
the proof. Also for ease of reference, we rewrite equation (6) again:
max fU0 (y + S; ) ; U1 (y + S   p1; )g = max fU0 (y; ) ; U1 (y   p0; )g .
Proof. First observe that by (6), we must have that S  0. Otherwise, the LHS of (6) must be
strictly smaller than the RHS, by the monotonicity of U0 () and U1 (). Now consider the following
cases.
Case (i): 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )
Since 0  U0 (y; )   U1 (y   p0; ), then the RHS of (6) is U0 (y; ). If S > 0, then the rst
term of LHS of (6) must be strictly larger than U0 (y; ), by strict monotonicity of U0 (; ). This
would imply that the LHS of (6) must be strictly larger than U0 (y; ) a contradiction. Therefore,
in this case, we must have S = 0. Intuitively, this means that those  who were not buying at the
initial price p0 do not need to be compensated.
Now, suppose case (i) does not hold, so that RHS maximum is in fact U1 (y   p0; ), i.e.,
U0 (y; )   U1 (y   p0; ) < 0. This corresponds to those s who buy the good at price p0. Now,
there are two possibilities regarding which term is the maximum in the LHS of (6)  case (ii)
corresponds to when the maximum is the rst term and case (iii) to when the maximum is the
second term.
Case (ii): Accordingly, rst assume that the LHS maximum is U0 (y + S; ). Then S must
satisfy
U0 (y + S; ) = U1 (y   p0; ) =) S = U 10 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y. (32)
Note that by the continuity condition of assumption 1, the inverse U 10 (; ) is dened everywhere.
In order for (32) to simultaneously satisfy that the LHS maximum of (6) is U0 (y + S; ), we need
U0 (y + S; )  U1 (y + S   p1; )
substituting S from (32)
=) U1 (y   p0; )  U1 (y + S   p1; )
=) y   p0  y + S   p1
=) p1   p0  S = U 10 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y
=) U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; )
=) 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; ) .
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Thus we arrive at the conclusion of case (ii), viz.,
U0 (y)  U1 (y   p0) < 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; ) and
S = U 10 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y.
Case (iii): Finally, consider the remaining case where the maximum of the LHS of (6) is
U1 (y + S   p1; ), whence we have
U1 (y + S   p1; ) = U1 (y   p0; )) S = p1   p0.
Replacing S in the LHS of (6), in order to be consistent with our assumption that the LHS maximum
is U1 (y + S   p1; ), we must have that
U1 (y + S   p1; )  U0 (y + S; ), U1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y + p1   p0; )
which is precisely case (iii) of the proposition, viz., U1 (y   p0; )  U0 (y + p1   p0; ).
C. Proof of Theorem 1
Proof. First consider EV. The compensation must be non-negative and no larger than p1   p0;
otherwise (5) will be violated. EV is zero for those not purchasing at p0 and hence EV has a point
mass equal to the probability of no purchase at p0, which is given by 1   q (p0; y). So the only
nontrivial step is for 0 < a < p1   p0. This case corresponds to case (ii) of Lemma 1. Accordingly,
for 0 < a < p1   p0, the probability of compensation not exceeding a is given by
Pr
 
SEV = 0; 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )

+Pr
0@ y   p0   U 11 (U0 (y; ) ; )  a;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p1; )
1A
= 1  q (p0; y)
+Pr
0@ 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0   a; ) ;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p1; )
1A
= 1  q (p0; y) + Pr (U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0   a; )) , since a < p1   p0
= 1  q (p0; y) + 1  q (p0 + a; y)  (1  q (p0; y))
= 1  q (p0 + a; y) ,
as desired.
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Now consider CV. First recall from (3) that for any a > 0, we have that
q (p0; y) = Pr (0 > U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )) ,
q (a+ p0; y + a) = Pr (0 > U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; )) ,
where the probabilities are computed w.r.t. the marginal distribution of .
Now, from lemma 2 and its proof, it is clear that for any , the compensation is non-negative
and it equals zero for those not buying at price p0. Hence the CV has no mass below 0 and a point
mass of 1  q (p0; y) at 0. Also, it is clear that the compensation cannot exceed p1   p0 for any .
Otherwise, (6) will be violated. Therefore the C.D.F. of CV must reach 1 at p1   p0. So the only
nontrivial case is 0 < a < p1   p0. This corresponds to case (ii) of proposition 3. Accordingly, for
0 < a < p1   p0, the probability of the compensation being no larger than a is given by
Pr
 
SCV = 0; U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )  0

+Pr
8<: U
 1
0 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y < a;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; )
9=;
= 1  q (p0; y)
+Pr
8<: U
 1
0 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y < a;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; )
9=; . (33)
Now,
Pr
0@ U 10 (U1 (y   p0; ) ; )  y < a;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; )
1A
= Pr
0@ 0 < U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; ) ;
U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y + p1   p0; )  U1 (y   p0; )
1A
= Pr (U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ) < 0  U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; )) , since a < p1   p0
= Pr (0  U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; ))  Pr
0@ U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )  0;
U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; )  0
1A
= Pr (0 < U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y   p0; ))  Pr (0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; )) since a  0
= Pr (0 < U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y + a  (a+ p0) ; ))  Pr (0  U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ))
= Pr (0 > U0 (y; )  U1 (y   p0; ))  Pr (0 > U0 (y + a; )  U1 (y + a  (a+ p0) ; ))
= q (p0; y)  q (a+ p0; y + a) .
Substituting in (33), we get that for 0 < a < p1   p0,
Pr

SCV  a	 = 1  q (p0; y) + q (p0; y)  q (a+ p0; y + a) = 1  q (a+ p0; y + a) ,
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as desired.
D. Proof of Corollary 1
We use the well-known result (c.f., Karr, 1993, p. 113) that for a positive random variable, X
with C.D.F. FX (), the expectation is given by
E (X) =
Z 1
0
(1  FX (a)) da. (34)
From (7) and (34), expected EV is given by
EV (y; p0; p1) =
Z p1 p0
0
q (a+ p0; y) da
=
Z p1
p0
q (z; y) dz, by change of variables z = a+ p0.
Next, using (8) and (34), we get that expected CV is given by
CV (y; p0; p1) =
Z p1 p0
0
q (a+ p0; y + a) da
=
Z p1
p0
q (z; y + z   p0) dz, substituting z = a+ p0.
E. Proof of Theorem 2
We provide the proof for CV; the proof of EV is exactly analogous.
Proof. Recall from (18) that the compensating variation is the solution S to the equation
max fU (y + S; p 1; ) ; U1 (y + S   p11; )g = max fU (y; p 1; ) ; U1 (y   p10; )g , (35)
where p 1 = (p2; p3; :::; pJ) and
U (y; p 1; )
def
= max fU0 (y; ) ; U2 (y   p2; ) ; :::; UJ (y   pJ ; )g .
Equation (35) is exactly analogous to (6) with U0 (y; ) replaced by U (y; p 1; ).
Assumption 2 implies that U (; p 1; ) is strictly increasing and continuous for each . Let
U 1 (p 1; b; ) denote the unique solution in x to the equation U (p 1; x; ) = b. Note that by
the continuity condition of assumption 2, the inverse U 1 (p 1; ; ) is dened everywhere. Now,
it can be seen that all our results from the binary case carry over with the utility U0 (y; ) replaced
by U (y; p 1; ), since the latter does not involve the price of alternative 1. Following through the
proof of lemma 2 with U0 (y; ) replaced by U (y; p 1; ) yields
SCV =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
0 if U1 (y   p10; ) < U (y; p 1; )
U 1 (U1 (y   p10; ) ; p 1; )  y, if
0@ U (y; p 1; )  U1 (y   p10; )
< U0 (y + p11   p10; )
1A
p11   p10 if U (y + p11   p10; p 1; ) < U1 (y   p10; )
.
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Similarly, following through the proof of theorem 1 with q (p; y) replaced by q1 (p1; p 1; y) (dened
in (14)) yields, analogous to (8), that
Pr

SCV (y; p10; p11; p 1; )  r

=
8>>><>>>:
0, if r < 0,
1  q1 (p10 + r; p 1; y + r) if 0  r < p11   p10,
1, if r  p11   p10,
F. Binary choice example where heterogeneity dimension is not identied
Suppose   (1; 0) is jointly independent of price and income (P; Y ) and 1 ? 0. Assume
that the support of price distribution in the data is contained in [0; pH ] and income is bounded
below by yL with yL > pH > 0. Let
U1 (Y   P; ) = Y   P + 1; U0 (Y; ) = (1  0)Y ,
where 0 is distributed uniform (0; 1) and the support of 1  denoted by T  is contained in
(pH   yL; 0). Denote the C.D.F of 1 by G (). An individual of type (y; ) and facing price p buys
the good if and only if y   p+ 1 > (1  0) y.
Thus for any xed  = (1; 0) in the support, the utility functions are continuous and strictly
increasing in income. Thus theorem 1 applies and it implies that the distribution of EV and CV
arising from a price change are point-identied.
Now, consider the choice probability in this model. Since pH   yL  1  0 wp1, it follows that
for any p; y in the support of the data, we must have that p  y < 1 < p, or
0 <
p  1
y
< 1, w.p. 1. (36)
Therefore, the structural choice probability of alternative 1 at price p and income y is given by
q1 (p; y) = Pr fy   p+ 1 > (1  2) yg
= Pr f2y + 1 > pg
= Pr

2 >
p  1
y

since y > 0
=
Z
T

1  p  1
y

dG (1) , by 1 ? 2, inequality (36) and 2  U (0; 1)
=

1  p
y

+
1
y
E (1) .
Thus, the choice probability q1 (p; y) depends on the distribution of 1 only through its expectation.
Therefore, all distributions for 1 with support contained in (pH   yL; 0) and having the same
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expectation will give rise to the same choice probability for each value of p and y, implying
that the distribution of 1 cannot be identied from the choice probabilities alone. In particular,
1  Uniform [pH   yL; 0] and 1 = pH yL2 with probability 1 will both produce identical q1 (p; y)
for all (p; y) in the support of price and income. This implies that the dimension of heterogeneity
is also not identied (dim(1; 0) is 1 when 1 is degenerate and 2 when 1 is uniform). Yet the
distribution of EV and CV are point-identied from q1 (; ) as implied by theorem 1 above.
The above example demonstrates that identiability of the heterogeneity distribution, or even
correct specication of its dimension are not a requirement for identiability of welfare distributions.
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